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Abstract 
 This thesis explores the nature of the relationship between foreign news media 
and network incidents against DoD networks.  A rank correlation was performed between 
the number of network incidents against DoD networks and foreign news media reports 
covering U.S. Military events.  Further analysis was conducted to determine the key 
terms used in the contents of foreign news media reports for the months the reports were 
significantly correlated with network incidents.  Several significant correlations were 
found between various combinations of regions and categories of network incidents.  
However, the correlations were only moderate and the key terms only led to a slightly 
better understanding of such relationships. 
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DETERMINING A RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FOREIGN NEWS MEDIA 
REPORTS COVERING U.S. MILITARY EVENTS AND NETWORK 
INCIDENTS AGAINST DOD NETWORKS 
 
 
I.  Introduction 
Background 
 Used for storing, processing, or transferring data, information systems are heavily 
relied upon by U.S. military forces for successful operations, such as aerial attacks, 
payroll, peace missions, and training.  This reliance on information systems is a result of 
the advantages of real time information acquisition and processing.  Information 
superiority is now a core competency of the U.S. Air Force and a necessary attribute of 
all military operations.  Information superiority is defined in Joint Publication 3-13 
(1998) as the capability to collect, process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of 
information while exploiting or denying an adversary’s ability to do the same.  The DoD 
accomplishes information superiority through the implementation of information 
operations (IO).   
Joint Publication 3-13 (1998) defines IO as actions taken to affect adversary 
information and information systems while defending one’s own information and 
information systems.  Defensive IO guarantees timely, accurate, and relevant information 
access while denying exploitation of friendly information and information systems 
through policy and procedures, operations, personnel, and technology.  A further subset 
of defensive IO is information assurance (IA).  IA is the protection and defense of 
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information system availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality, and non-
repudiation. 
IA is carried out for the DoD by NetDefense, also known as the DoD Computer 
Emergency Response Team (CERT).  NetDefense assesses incident data collected from 
the Joint CERT Database (JCD) which is populated by all DoD organizations.  An 
incident is one network attack or several network attacks related to each other through 
significant similarities in attackers, techniques, victims, and timing (Howard, 1997).  A 
network attack is an unauthorized attempt to access a computer, regardless of whether or 
not the attempt was successful.  Figure 1 illustrates the number of incidents per month 
against DoD networks for the past two years.   
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Figure 1: Monthly NetDefense statistics on Incidents Reported from January 2002 though 
June 2004 (JTF-GNO GNC NetDefense, 2004). 
 
 IA is necessary because of the numerous vulnerabilities inherent in information 
systems.  These vulnerabilities include a lack of reliable intrusion detection tools, 
insufficient security manpower, information system complexity and size, and a 
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monoculture of tools operating on the information systems (CERT/CC, 2003).  Intrusion 
detection systems (IDS) are unable to analyze all network traffic because data transfer 
rates are too fast and IDS processing speeds are too slow (Allen, Christie, Fithen, 
McHugh, Pickel, Stoner, 2000).  Furthermore, IDS methods for detecting new types of 
intrusions are unreliable because the primary detection method compares old intrusion 
data with current data.  The more variation between a new attack and older attacks, the 
less likely the new attack will be detected.  To compensate for the lack of reliability in 
IDS, manual detection techniques are also used.  However, the increasing number of 
attackers and amount of data to be analyzed is a growing burden for a limited security 
workforce.  The burden on security is further increased because of the size and 
complexity of information systems (CERT/CC, 2003).  Networks include numerous users 
and multiple connections to the internet along with remote servers; each new component 
adds to the complexity of the overall system.  The complexity is minimized in the DoD 
by implementing standardized equipment and procedures for each network.  The use of 
similar equipment, however, creates a less complex environment for an adversary to plan 
an attack against.  It is simpler because the attacker would otherwise have to employ 
separate attack techniques against different types of operating systems, network routing 
equipment, software applications, etc.  Regardless of the employment of IDS tools and 
improved security procedures, the number of incidents per year has increased steadily for 
the past several years. 
Some of the reasons for the reported increase in incidents may include the use of 
better intrusion detection tools and practices and increased participation in incident 
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reporting (CERT/CC, 2003).   These factors suggest a greater incident volume 
unaccounted for in previous years.  Increased participation in incident reporting was due 
to the benefits each contributor gained in understanding attack methods by combining 
their incident information.  This information was used to create better procedures and 
tools to detect and deny attacks.   
Other reasons for the rising number of network incidents are attacker’s use of 
better network attacking tools (Allen, et. al, 2000), the proliferation of the internet, and an 
increasing number of potential attackers.  User friendly software tools simplify the ability 
for an individual to perform a network attack so minimal knowledge of information 
systems is needed by the attacker.  Figure 2 illustrates the different types of attack tools 
created from 1980 through 2000 and the relative amount of intruder knowledge required 
to use these tools (CERT/CC, 2003). 
Figure 2: Attack Sophistication vs. Intruder Technical Knowledge (CERT/CC, 2003) 
Because it is easy to become an attacker, as more people and organizations connect to the 
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internet so does the number of potential attackers.  Figure 3 shows how the growth of the 
Internet has increased exponentially for the past decade. 
Figure 3: Internet domain survey host count (Source: Internet Systems Consortium, Inc. 
(http://www.isc.org/)) 
 
Several motivations exist for people to conduct network attacks.  Howard and 
Longstaff’s (1998) taxonomy clarifies the possible objectives for network attacks as 
“challenge, status, thrill,” “political gain,” “financial gain,” and “damage.”  These 
motivations have been further validated by Diagle (2001).  "Challenge, status, thrill" 
groups three similar motivations together. They are combined because in each case the 
point of the attack is to do no more then gain access to an information system or bypass 
its security.  An incident is considered "damage" motivated when unauthorized 
modifications or destruction is done to an information system.  Some individuals use their 
computer skills to gain unauthorized control of an information system and hold it ransom, 
destroy it, or steal information in hopes of gaining a market advantage.  These types of 
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attacks are done for "financial gain."  "Political gain" motivations are similar to financial 
ones except the results benefit an attacker's government or hinder the victim's 
government.  The public was made aware politically motivated attacks were occurring 
against the U.S. when in 1998 the CIA director, George Tenet, stated other nation's 
governments are funding network attacks against the United States (Yurcik, Loomis, and 
Korzyk, 2000).   
The news media has been the public’s primary source for information on 
government actions since the time of the revolutionary war (McHugh, 1997).  The 
information supplied by the news media gives the American public the knowledge of the 
U.S. government to make necessary decisions or take actions concerning the U.S. 
government.  Therefore, media reports may have a direct influence on the actions of the 
public (Hill, 1997).  Both the U.S. government and its adversaries have taken advantage 
of the effects the media has on public opinion to gain political advantage (Snyder, 2003).  
Furthermore, media reports may contain sensitive DoD information which our 
adversaries could use to their advantage (McHugh, 1997).   
DoD public affairs policy has been created to supply the news media with the 
support it needs for effective reporting and counteract the potential threats created by the 
news media.  Within the policy are guidelines on how to include the media when 
planning military operations so the public remains well informed, but not give up 
sensitive information.  When the news media gains access to sensitive information it is 
expected to be secured through self controlled reporting guidelines held by the media 
(Snyder, 2003).  Censorship is still used, but its use is minimized because of the lack of 
 
7 
trust it generates between the government and the public (McHugh, 1997).   
It is possible there may be sensitive information being reported not yet known to 
the DoD.  The DoD needs a better understanding of what information should be 
considered sensitive if this is true.  In addition, the number of effects media reports have 
on public opinion is not fully understood.  A better comprehension for the effects media 
reports have on public actions could lead to improved policy and guidance to reduce 
negative results.   
Problem Statement 
 DoD officials need to know whether media reports involving military events 
influence the number of incidents occurring on DoD systems.  Network operators need to 
better prepare DoD information systems against network attacks and DoD officials need 
better media relationship policies if a relationship is determined to exist.  The purpose of 
this research is to determine what relationships exist between foreign news media 
coverage of military events and DoD network incidents through qualitative codification 
and quantitative statistical analysis of data collected by NetDefense and the Foreign 
Broadcast Information System (FBIS) for the same time period.  The hypothesis being 
tested is whether or not a correlation exists between the frequency of foreign news media 
reports of military events and the frequency of DoD network incidents.  The null 
hypothesis is that no correlation exists. 
Research Questions 
 What is the nature of the relationship between foreign news media reports 
covering U.S. military events and network incidents against DoD networks? 
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Investigative Questions 
 To better answer the research question, this research proposes to answer the 
following investigative questions: 
1. Do statistically significant correlations exist between different foreign regions 
of news media reports involving U.S. military events and different categories 
of DoD network incidents? 
2. During what timeframes do the most statistically significant correlations 
occur? 
3. What is the content of the news media reports for the timeframes that are most 
significantly correlated? 
Problem Approach 
 Data for this research was gathered through the collection of the most recent 
historical incident data available within the timeframe of this research maintained by 
NetDefense and a qualitative analysis of eight regions of foreign news media reports 
maintained by FBIS from January of 2002 to June of 2004.  The relationship between 
each category of incident and news from each foreign region is explored separately to 
take into account the different possible types of correlations the media may have with 
DoD network incidents, both positive and negative.  The qualitative analysis of media 
reports was done through the use of a data mining tool, IN-SPIRE.  The IN-SPIRE 
software is used to quantify the number of foreign news media reports containing military 
events for each day of the study.   By using the JMP 5.1 statistical software to perform 
the Spearman’s Rank Test for correlation, the foreign news media and DoD network 
 
9 
incident data were analyzed to determine the existence of any correlations.  IN-SPIRE 
was then used to determine the most significant content of the media reports. 
Scope 
The point of this research is to find attributes in foreign media reports correlated 
with network incidents against DoD networks.  This research will utilize the most recent 
daily DoD incident data collected on the JCD attained from NetDefense along with daily 
foreign media reports acquired from the FBIS for the time period of January 2002 to June 
2004.  The two and a half year time span will provide a thorough sample of recorded 
DoD incident data and foreign news media reports.  This research does not attempt to 
suggest what security policy or procedures should be implemented, but investigates the 
possible correlation between foreign news media reports involving military events and 
DoD network incidents.   
The growing expansion of the internet has made geographical boundaries 
irrelevant.  Because of the internet, network attackers are able to assault any network 
connected to the internet from virtually anywhere on earth.  Therefore, a complete 
collection of foreign media reports is used for the same time period as the network 
incident data in this research.  Once any significant correlations are found to exist and the 
content of the news media ascertained, or if no correlations exist, the research will be 
completed.   The practitioner may therefore be able to use the information and determine 
how the results affect their operations. 
Each service, and some individual agencies, maintain a separate network 
emergency response team to track and repair incidents against their systems.  The 
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incident data from each service is collected on the JCD for further analysis and reporting.  
For this research the combined data from the JCD attained from NetDefense is used 
rather than data for each service.  One service may have a higher correlation than the 
other services, but first a correlation should be determined to exist.  Data exists for 
civilian incidents, but it is excluded because this research focuses on information relevant 
to DoD operations and civilian incident reporting procedures are not as well established 
as in the DoD.  
This research encompasses six of the eight categories of network incidents 
tracked by the DoD.  Of the two categories not employed, incidents classified as 
“unknown” are excluded because they have yet been properly understood and put into a 
more meaningful category.  Incidents in the category “poor security practice” are also 
excluded because they are the result of user error.  In other words, "poor security 
practice" incidents are the result of actions not taken to properly secure an information 
system and fall outside the scope of this research.  The remaining six categories 
(unauthorized access, unauthorized user access, unsuccessful attempted access, denial of 
service, unauthorized probe, and malicious logic) will be analyzed against the media 
reports.    
Assumptions & Limitations 
This research hopes to discover a relationship among DoD network incidents and 
foreign news media reports covering military events by comparing existing DoD network 
incident data and foreign media archives.  Due to the extremely irregular nature of 
network incidents, several other factors that affect the number of incidents on DoD 
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systems could create enough interference to conceal any correlation.  As an example, one 
of the tools used to determine if an incident has occurred, intrusion detection systems 
(IDS), are far from being a truly accurate measurement device of network incidents 
(Allen et. al, 2000).   
While an abundant number of foreign news media archives exist, it is beyond the 
abilities and resources of this research to consider every national and international source 
of media.  Rather, this study assumes the over 3000 sources of foreign news media 
collected and archived by FBIS will be a sufficient sample of foreign news media.  The 
exclusion of media reports from within the United States is assumed not to be a 
contributing factor to any correlations with other international regions, but may be a 
consideration for follow-on research.   
Because the data are non-parametric, Spearman’s Rank test is required to 
determine a correlation.   One potential problem with Spearman’s Rank test is when the 
data have a large number of tied data points relative to the entire data set.  When a tie 
occurs each number is given the same rank based on the amount of numbers with the 
same value.  The result may skew the results of this research.  In addition, the values for 
some of the data sets may fail to reflect a continuous distribution of the two variables 
being measured.  Category I, II, IV incident data and the military related media reports 
per week data have small values for the samples making this assumption less then ideal.  
Several more ties may occur as a result.  However, the vast accumulation of data within 
the databases and the large amounts of data for each week seems to satisfy the 
assumptions required for the Spearman’s Rank test.  Furthermore, Spearman’s test uses 
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the t-distribution to determine the significance of any correlations.  Therefore the validity 
of a Spearman Rank test depends on a normal distribution of correlation values for the 
population. 
A final limitation is the use of IN-SPIRE to determine the content of media 
reports.  The ability of the IN-SPIRE tool to separate and extract media reports 
containing U.S. military events from the collection of foreign media is also a potential 
limitation to this research.  Various forms of military operations exist with vague 
definitions making it difficult to perform a query accurately extract the entire collection 
of military related news reports.  This is especially difficult when the number of news 
media reports is extremely large, such as the thousands of documents used for this 
research.  Furthermore, while the techniques used to determine the primary content of 
correlated media reports will be effective and provide valuable insight, they are far from 
validated with this being the first time IN-SPIRE will be used for research in this manner. 
Research Overview 
The remaining chapters of this thesis provide the details of this research.  Chapter 
II contains the literature review, which explores the existing body of knowledge pertinent 
to this research topic.  Chapter III describes the method used and assumptions made to 
analyze the data.  Chapter IV provides the findings of the analysis performed on the data.  
Finally, Chapter V discusses the finding, presents conclusions, and makes 
recommendations for further research.  
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II. Literature Review 
Chapter Overview 
The intent of this chapter is to give the reader a brief review of relevant material 
concerning the two factors of this research: foreign news media reports covering military 
events and network incidents against DoD systems.  The problem of determining a 
correlation among the news media's coverage of military events and network incidents is 
specific yet includes a wide range of topics.  Consequentially, only a few research papers 
exist to use as the basis of this research.   The majority of information relating to this 
research problem consisted of a historical review of network security, the past and 
present relationship between the news media and the military, DoD network and news 
media policy, and the effects the media can have on the public.    
 For the purpose of this thesis the terms “media coverage,” “network incident,” 
and “military events” need to be clarified.  “Media coverage” is any form of publication 
or broadcast widely distributed throughout a region.  Media coverage can therefore take 
many forms: radio, magazines, newspapers, television, and so forth.  The term “network 
attack” is defined as the unauthorized attempt to view, change, or corrupt information 
contained on a computer system.  A “network intrusion” is a successful attack that results 
in an attacker having gained access to a network system.  A “network incident,” however, 
is a collection of attacks that share some commonalities, such as a particular victim or 
goal.  Incidents can be distinguished from other incidents because of the sites attacked, 
techniques used, and individuals performing the attacks.  Incidents range from a simple 
probe of a computer system to the complete destruction of all contents of several 
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computer networks.  Finally, “military events” is defined as any action conducted by the 
U.S. military. 
Computer and Network History  
 This section presents an overview of relevant history concerning information 
systems, the Internet, and reasons these systems are vulnerable to network attacks.  
Within this history it is shown how security and distribution of information are inversely 
proportionate to one another.  This section concludes with a brief review of IDS history 
and its usefulness as a tracking tool for network attacks. 
Information System Technology 
Information systems have always proven to be more of an asset then a risk, but as 
technology has progressed the level of risk compared to the benefits of information 
systems has increased.  Security measures for information systems thirty years ago, such 
as the mainframe computer, were not as big a concern as they are today.  Physical 
measures were more then capable of handling potential attackers because the information 
could only be accessed from a single location.  Once physical security wasn’t sufficient 
manual auditing became the primary source for ensuring the availability and integrity of 
information system assets (Witkin, 1995).  As the amount of data stored on information 
systems increased manual auditing became too labor-intensive to be effective.  However, 
the small number of skilled individuals capable of performing a successful attack on 
information systems minimized the chances an attack would occur on any one system.  
The advantages of worldwide data communication outweighed the threats of using 
information systems.   
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 At this point in time security wasn’t a large concern.  Because of its size the 
information system, called a "mainframe," was centrally located within an organization.  
The central location simplified maintenance and the security of the mainframe computer, 
only the rooms containing a mainframe computer needed to be secured (Witkin, 1995).  
Security was even less of an issue because access to the mainframe was only allowed by 
a small group of computer operators.  An attack would have to be initiated by one of the 
few employees who had access to the system.   
 In the late 1970s the computing process was decentralized by smaller and cheaper 
information systems, called PCs (Witkin, 1995).  More people now had access to 
information processing, but it was at the cost of reduced security.  More information 
systems meant increased vulnerability.  Security was no longer centralized to a single 
physical location and accountability became increasingly difficult with the growing 
number of PC users.  Internal threats, such as disgruntled employees, were the largest 
threat to an information system. 
Initially, the only way to share data between PCs was physical media, such as a 
floppy disk.  As PCs became more dispersed throughout an organization users wanted an 
efficient way to share data (Witkin, 1995).  Physical media was a threat to system 
security, but a bigger threat occurred when user demand led to the interconnection of 
multiple information systems to form networks.   This allowed transfer of information 
directly between information systems.  The addition of each new connection added 
another potential vulnerability or threat to the overall system.    Manual auditing became 
increasingly difficult because of the amount of information on a system plus the amount 
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of information being passed between systems.  
 Network security was again degraded when the geographical limitations of 
potential attackers were removed through distributed architectures which allowed more 
users access to information systems from vast distances.  The initial distributed 
architecture was called a local area network (LAN) which encompassed an area no larger 
than the size of a city block.  The use of LANs eventually led to the development of a 
network that permitted communication within an area the size of an entire city.  These 
types of networks were called Metropolitan Area Networks (MAN) (Witkin, 1995).  
Eventually global communication networks were developed, called Wide Area Networks 
(WAN).  Communication protocols for the WANs, MANs, and LANs were not 
standardized, separate phone lines were leased to handle the data transfer for each 
network.  Therefore an attacker would have to know what type of communication was 
being used on a network and also be able to gain physical access to the network 
communication lines. 
Internet Technology 
The goal of the Advanced Research Projects Agency Network (ARPANET) in 
1969 was to develop a common communications protocol to increase the speed and 
robustness of government digital communication networks.  The security for ARPANET 
wasn’t a primary concern because only U.S. government agencies had access to it.  In 
1986 the ARPANET was handed over to the National Science Foundation (NSF) and 
expanded to include users from the private sector forming what was called the “Internet.”   
The Internet expanded quickly as organizations realized its benefits.  Many 
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advantages exist for using the Internet over a WAN, such as cost and convenience, the 
primary disadvantage being security.  A connection to the existing internet is 
considerably cheaper than leasing the communication lines necessary for a WAN, but this 
meant openly sharing communication lines.  The Internet is also more durable then a 
WAN because of the multitude of interconnections message traffic can be routed through, 
yet the interconnections threaten security since all other users are connected to the same 
communication lines (Lipson, 2002).  
In late 1988 the first reported major incident occurred on the Internet.  The 
incident was a computer program called a worm which caused information systems to 
lockup fooling them into attempting to connect to nonexistent IP addresses.  This 
effectively shut down use of the Internet.  Even with the devastating effects caused by the 
single malicious attack the advantages of using the Internet outweigh the risk.  This is 
true even as the number of users grew and the potential for malicious activity became 
more of a concern.  To make matters worse, security was difficult to improve upon 
because Internet standards had already been well established (Lipson, 2002).  
Intrusion Detection 
 Intrusion detection became necessary in the early 1970s when network 
connectivity began to threaten information security (McHugh, 2001).  Intrusion detection 
was initially done through manual auditing of computer logs.  Manual auditing worked 
well during the 1970s because computer systems could be accessed only by a small group 
of users and computer logs were small enough to be manually inspected.  However, as 
the amount of data increased and the number of connections grew the task of manual 
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auditing became effectively inconceivable (McHugh, 2001).   
As the threat of network attacks grew, organizations began to implement 
additional security measures in addition to manual auditing to counteract the threat.  A 
prevalent tool used to counteract the threat of attacks was the intrusion detection system 
(IDS).  IDSs are automated auditing tools used to collect and sort data such as logs or 
transmissions from a network or computer system then alert administrators when that 
data contain characteristics of an intrusion (McHugh, 2001).  The fundamental method of 
comparing known attack data with current network traffic data for intrusion detection, 
around since the early 1980s, is still the primary basis for intrusion detection today.  
Unfortunately, IDSs are too slow to keep up with network traffic and unreliable when 
distinguishing new types of attacks (Allen et. al, 2000).  Because of there limitations, 
attacks detected by an IDS on an information system can only be considered a portion of 
the actual number of attacks. 
Past Incident Prediction Research 
The problem of determining a correlation among foreign media coverage of 
military events and network incidents is specific yet includes a wide range of topics.  
Though most information relating to this research problem did not pertain to correlation 
analysis the few existing research articles found using incident data to predict future 
incidents were the basis of this research.   
There are three research documents that address incident analysis as a method to 
reduce future incidents: Ginn, 2001; Yurcik, Loomis, and Korzyk, 2000; and Korzyk, 
1998.  This is understandable considering how narrow the topic is and the lack of valid 
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and reliable metrics in the past.  Each paper focused on the reactive nature of network 
security and the desire to create more proactive security tools and procedures.  Although 
this research considers a much wider range of potential effects of the foreign media and 
incident data then attempted before, the existing research provided a solid basis for this 
study.   
Korzyk (1998) developed a forecast model using historical incident data to predict 
future incident volume.  A forecasting model has many similarities to a correlation 
analysis, both require use of statistical analysis to compare past data and find trends or 
similarities.  Once significant trends are discovered the data can be used to create a model 
and predict future trends or determine the causes of the trends.  Korzyk’s (1998) research 
found a slight seasonality correlation and additional trends in the incident data.  He used 
several forecasting models to find the best fit for predicting incident data, but none were 
successful enough to be of significant use.  Korzyk’s notice of incident trends did show 
evidence some types of correlations and predictions may exist for incident data.   
Yurcik, Loomis, and Korzyk (2000) focused their research on how incidents were 
detected and reported.  Several problems exist with analyzing incident data: growth of the 
Internet, changing technology, low reporting rates for security incidents, false alarms 
rates, and the changing nature of Internet attacks (Yurcik, et. al, 2000).  The problems can 
be minimized if proper metrics are used.  The following is a list of metrics suggested by 
Yurcik et. al (2000): 
• Type of Internet attack based on a common taxonomy 
• Number/percentage of Internet attack frequency growth 
• Number/percentage of detected/undetected Internet attacks 
• Number/percentage of successful/unsuccessful Internet attacks 
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• Number/percentage of reported/unreported Internet attacks 
• Number/percentage of automated Internet attacks 
• Types of automated Internet attacks – tools used/ports probed 
• Stationarity of Internet attacks over time (day/day of week/month/year/season) 
• Duration of Internet attacks (day/month/year) 
• Number of hosts involved in Internet attacks 
• Damage Cost estimate for distinct Internet attacks 
• Geographical location (physical and virtual mapping) of Internet attacks 
• Targeted systems (location/organization/vendor/operating system) 
 
This is a list of potential metrics that would help prevent incidents, not an actual list of 
current metrics.  Most organizations have different lists of metrics which depends on their 
methods of incident reporting (Yurcik et. al, 2000).  The lack of a standard set of network 
incident metrics hinders the ability to determine if correlations exist among the combined 
incident data.  Furthermore, advanced intrusion tools and distributive attack techniques 
allow attacks to be performed in a chaotic manner in which a correlation would be harder 
to discern (Yurcik et. al, 2000).   
Patrick Ginn (2001) did a regression analysis and discovered no correlation 
between incidents tracked by the Fleet Information Warfare Center and United States 
foreign media exposure for the year 1999.  He used the IN-SPIRE software to quantify 
the number of media reports per week related to the United States.  However, a 
regression test does not work well when determining a correlation with highly fluctuating 
data sets.  Also, Ginn (2001) only used foreign media documents that contained the exact 
phrase "United States" and combined the incident data from categories I, II, III, IV, VI, 
and VI for his analysis.  Incident analysis methods and intrusion detection techniques 
during this time were not well established.  As a result incident data were not as well 
documented.  Fortunately for this research, the methods used by the DoD to analyze and 
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categorize intrusions have become much more consistent in recent years. 
DoD Network Incident Metrics  
 Network incident data used in this research was attained from the Joint CERT 
Database (JCD).  The JCD is a collection of various defense agency incident data used by 
NetDefense.  NetDefense is also known as the Department of Defense Computer 
Emergency Response Team (DoD CERT) who falls under the Joint Task Force Global 
Network Operations (JTF-GNO) agency which works to protect, defend, and restore 
elements of the global information grid.  The JCD incident data contains eight categories:  
unauthorized access, unauthorized user access, unsuccessful attempted access, denial of 
service, poor security practices, unauthorized probe, malicious logic, and unknown 
(Table 1). 
Table 1: Incident Category Description 
Category Description 
I Unauthorized Root Access 
II Unauthorized User Access 
III Attempted Access 
IV Denial of Service 
V Poor Security Practice 
VI Probe or Scan 
VII Malicious Code 
VIII Unknown  
   
Each category is specific to a type of network incident described as follows.  
Unauthorized root access and unauthorized user access describe the type of privileges an 
attacker gains for an information system.  They encompass a range of incidents from 
improperly logging into a user's account, such as a hacker logging into a legitimate user's 
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account, to obtaining unauthorized access to files and directories.  Unauthorized root 
access incidents occur when access is gained to a system with root privileges without 
authorization.  Unauthorized user access incidents occur when access with user privileges 
is gained to a system without authorization.   
 Unsuccessful attempted access is the next type of network incident tracked by the 
DoD.  Unsuccessful attempted access is defined as repeated attempts to gain access as 
root or user on the same information system from the same source.  Tracking these types 
of incidents shows how successful safeguards of DoD systems are in incident prevention 
and produce information on attacks volume.   
 Successful disruptions of network operations are labeled “denial of service” 
incidents. More specifically, denial of service incidents are unauthorized actions which 
preempt or prevent any part of an information system from functioning properly, such 
actions include destruction, modification, or degrade performance of a system or network 
affecting the mission, business, or function of an organization.   
 An unauthorized probe is any attempt to gather information about an automated 
information system or its users on-line by scanning a site and accessing ports through 
operating system vulnerabilities.  Probes can be used by attackers to find out information 
about a network for a future or ongoing attack.   
 Finally, the category of malicious logic incidents are the most obvious and 
disruptive attacks caused by hidden hardware, software, or firmware that is intentionally 
included in an information system for an unauthorized purpose.  Malicious logic software 
is self-replicating and disseminated by being attached to or mimicking authorized 
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computer system files, such as a Trojan horse, worm, malicious scripting, or a logic 
bomb.  The effects of malicious logic attacks include but are not limited to simple 
monitoring of traffic, corruption of information, disclosure of information, theft of 
service, and automated backdoors with full system rights.  
 The two categories “poor security practice” and “unknown” can be separated 
from the other six categories for the following reasons.  “Poor security practice” metrics 
are actions of the victim not the attacker, such as uninstalled software security patches.  
“Unknown” incidents are yet to be classified into one of the other seven categories, 
therefore “unknown” is not an actual incident category itself.  However, most “unknown” 
incidents are later reclassified into “denial of service” incidents (Svetlev, 2004).  
Therefore, because neither poor security practice nor unknown incidents can be, at least 
yet, considered direct actions of an attacker the data from these categories are not 
included in this research. 
 Howard’s (1997) original taxonomy of network attacks divides the method of 
access to a network into two groups of users, those that are not authorized access and 
those that are not authorized use.  However, Howard and Longstaff’s 1998 taxonomy 
(Figure 4) does not directly distinguish between these two categories.  Rather, Howard 
and Longstaff (1998) eliminate the access category and refer to attacks as having 
unauthorized results.  This improves the mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive 
properties of their taxonomy but fails to address the importance of access metrics, as was 
verified by Daigle (2001).  Knowledge is gained from breaking down access 
characteristics of network attacks.   
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 Howard and Longstaff’s (1998) taxonomy continues to segregate network attacks 
by their unauthorized results: increased access, disclosure of information, corruption of 
information, denial of service, and theft of information.  One of these results (denial of 
service) is tracked by the "denial of service" DoD incident metric.  Unauthorized root 
access, unauthorized user access, and attempted access DoD incident metrics track the 
level of increased access addressed in the taxonomy.  Unfortunately, DoD incident 
metrics do not break down further which category of incidents address the disclosure, 
corruption, or theft of information.  While this does limit the scope of this research, it is 
not necessary to determine if a relationship exists between foreign news media reports of 
DoD events and network attacks against DoD systems.   
Figure 4: 1998 Computer and Network Incident Taxonomy 
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The Motivations of a Network Attacker 
 As can be seen in Howard and Longstaff’s (1998) taxonomy the objectives for 
network attacks include “challenge, status, thrill,” “political gain,” “financial gain,” and 
“damage.”  “Challenge, status, and thrill” is a very broad category which encompasses 
attacks that may mean no harm, but are done simply to break through the security of a 
network system.  By contrast, the other motivations are meant to cause either direct or 
indirect damage to the system under attack.  The purpose of political gain is to gather 
information and at the same time deny that information from opponents for the purpose 
of gaining an advantage for one’s own government.  Motivation for financial gain differs 
from political gain because the objective pertains to wealth.  Financial gain attacks can 
consist of monetary compensation for the safe return of stolen information similar to a 
ransom, or steeling information for increased competitive advantage or market share.  
Motivation to cause damage results in the types of events seen readily in the media.  
“Damage” motivated attacks, such as denial of service or malicious logic attacks are not 
as focused on specific networks.  Rather, these attacks start at any system on a network 
and can spread to all other systems connected to that network.   “Damage” motivated 
attacks are clarified in depth by Kleen (2001) in her thesis, “A Case Study on Malicious 
Hackers.”   
A trend in the categorization of motivations which is taken to an extreme by 
Jordan and Taylor (1998) is a focus on challenge and status as the primary reasons for 
network attacks.  The type of hackers that perform network attacks for challenge and 
status consist of individuals with an internet connection and the few tools necessary to 
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connect into an unauthorized network.  This class of attacker is composed of members of 
the general public who take the time to learn about the tools and techniques use to 
perform network attacks.  
Network attack motivations are universal to employees and non-employees.  
However, non-employees have additional physical or electronic security measures to 
bypass before they can gain access to a system.  Employees already have some access to 
their organization’s network, which is one reason why the majority of successful attacks 
are perpetrated by employees. 
DoD Network Policy 
 There are three forms of policy governing networks within the DoD; they cover 
access rights to DoD systems by both DoD personnel and authorized non-DoD personnel, 
security of DoD systems, and network connections to and between DoD systems. 
DoD Policy on Access to Information 
 Because the DoD’s function is the security of the nation and its people the 
information held within the DoD is the property of U.S. citizens.  Therefore, this section 
covers government policy on access to DoD information in two parts, one for the general 
public, the other for DoD employees. 
Public Access to Information 
DoDD 5400.7 Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) states that in order to promote 
public trust, the maximum amount of information about DoD activities should be easily 
accessible by any U.S. citizen who requests it.  The FOIA allows complete disclosure of 
DoD information and activities to the general public, with the exception of any 
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information that is private to individuals within the DoD, subject to classification, or 
deemed sensitive for reasons of national security.  DoD Directive (DoDD) 5230.9, which 
clarifies the procedures for declassifying information for public release, states that clear 
and accurate information be declassified and distributed as soon as is possible to aid the 
public’s understanding of DoD actions and policy.   
DoD policy affirms the public should be allowed access to all DoD information 
not subject to restrictions for national security.  However, DoDD 5230.9 and the FOIA 
state access to DoD information must be under the control of DoD personnel.  
Unauthorized access by members of the public to DoD unclassified public information is 
considered an attack.  To avoid any potential problems a request for DoD information 
must be handled through the proper procedures.    
DoD Personnel Access to Information 
 DoDD 5200.1 and DoDD 8500.1 require DoD personnel be educated and trained 
in the protection and classification of computerized classified information and network 
defense techniques.  Education and training also clarify the responsibilities of the 
individual member in how to prevent unauthorized disclosure of information.   
The proper control of information by DoD members is well established in DoD 
policy.  Guidance on who should be allowed access to sensitive information is outlined in 
DoDD 5200.2, DoDD 5200.2R, and DoDD 8500.1.  These directives state that no person 
should be allowed assess to classified information unless it is in the interest of the 
nation’s security.  Finally, DoDD 5200.2R stipulates the requirement for all DoD 
personnel to have appropriate background checks and training before being granted 
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access to DoD computer or network systems. 
Information System Security Policy 
DoD Instruction (DoDI) 5200.40 applies directly to the security of DoD 
information systems.  DoDI 5200.40 establishes a process to certify and accredit 
information systems and verify each one has been checked for security flaws as well as 
has an acceptable level of risk.  The certification and accreditation (C&A) process 
measures security by assessing the level of risk of each DoD owned computer system and 
the significance of that system to DoD operations.  Tools to measure the significance of 
each system and determine appropriate security measures are contained in DoDI 5200.40 
as well.  The C&A process includes annual evaluations for each system to ensure all 
irrelevant information is removed or new information is included on the most recent 
C&A.   
The C&A process places responsibility on the designated approving authority 
(DAA).  The DAA is an individual who must have the authority to accept responsibility 
and risk of the system.  Usually the DAA is an O-6 grade officer or higher assigned 
command of an organization which is responsible for the information system.  The DAA 
verifies and signs that a satisfactory C&A was accomplished.  When this process is 
carried out properly the information system is considered secured.   
Network Connection Policy 
DoD networks are allowed connection to outside organizations, such as 
international allies, other government agencies, and civilian organizations deemed 
necessary for mission accomplishment.  Outside access should only be completed with 
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the approval of the network DAA who has the responsibility to verify the connection 
requirements are necessary for mission accomplishment and are within an acceptable 
level of risk (DoD Instruction 8500.1).  The term “acceptable level of risk” is rather 
obscure for a system connected to an inherently varying level of risk.  DoDI 5200.40 and 
8510.1M quantify external connection risk by evaluating several factors of both the risk 
in using a particular system and the criticality of that system in support of DoD 
operations.  The more critical a system is to the DoD, such as saving lives and money, the 
less risk the DoD will take with that system.  Of course, risk can be reduced by increasing 
security measures, such as minimizing network connections. 
News Media and DoD Relationship 
 The First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution states, “Congress shall make no 
law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or 
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to 
assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.”  How much 
freedom the press is allowed is difficult to interpret.  Through time our nation's press, 
DoD policy regarding the press, and DoD operations have adapted to one another in hope 
of reaching a happy medium.   
History of the News Media and the U.S. Military 
 Both DoD and media personnel accept their relationship as vital to maintain our 
nation’s freedom (Aukofer and Lawrence 1995).  Maj Raymond Hill, Jr. (1997) referred 
to the media as the vital link between Carl von Clausewitz Remarkable Trinity of the 
people, their government, and their military.  This section overviews the history between 
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the military and its link to the people, the media. 
The Formation of Today’s Relationship 
 For the U.S. the earliest form of mass media was a majority of opinionated 
articles on a single sheet of paper during the Revolutionary War (McHugh, 1997).  These 
articles didn’t have content restrictions, or rules governing content validity.  The uses of 
the press were soon found to be beneficial in spreading information, but also a hindrance 
when the information was biased or misleading.   
 The press was more prominent in the Civil War where reporters were included on 
the battlefield for the first time in U.S. history.  The motivation for the media was the 
public's growing desire for information on the war.  So strong was this desire that the 
military didn’t dare interfere with the media for fear a public uproar.  At this point in time 
the speed news traveled became faster then military movements, meaning opposing 
forces could gain significant intelligence from public news reports (Hill, 1997).  The 
military had relied on a trusting relationship to keep information like troop movements 
and battle plans safe from publication.  Eventually this trust broke down and the press 
published vital operational information setting up the need for U.S. Government control 
of news media actions. 
 The media’s access to information remained under government control through 
the first and second world wars.  Regardless of the restrictions, at the time the public and 
the media were extremely patriotic so few protests were ever made.  The harmony ended 
years later during the Vietnam War when censorship was lifted and the media’s coverage 
began including subject matter that supporters of the military believed was biased and 
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meant to persuade the public to force a premature end to the war.  The result was a bitter 
relationship between the media and military, both accusing the other of providing 
inaccurate or biased information (McHugh, 1997). 
 To improve the relationship the military began to set policy where news media 
involvement became a part of operational planning (Aukofer and Lawrence, 1995).  
However, most operational planners chose to exclude the media because of their hard 
feelings caused by Vietnam War coverage.   Most plans continued excluding the needs of 
the media through the 70’s and early 80’s.  During the Gulf War of the early 1990’s, 
military plans began to include the requirements for media coverage, but still failed to 
completely encompass the needs of the media.  The media also failed to fully understand 
the military.  Many military members complained of media reporters’ lack of knowledge 
concerning the military’s operations and structure (Aukofer and Lawrence, 1995).  The 
military continues to improving its relationship with the media today by establishing rules 
and principles for both the military and the media to follow, relying on trust to maintain 
its effectiveness. 
Significance of the Media in the United States 
 The early press during the Revolutionary War was rudimentary in its collection of 
information as well as the reporting of that information.  Newspapers were only a page 
long and took hours to print a significant number of copies (McHugh, 1997).  Although 
news was limited, it was thoroughly read by the public (Snyder, 2003).  The news media 
had difficulty getting information because the slow communication links between where 
news was made and where it was published.  In the next two centuries a revolution took 
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place that drastically reduced the amount of time it took news reports to reach the public. 
The public’s desire for news created commercial competition which pushed 
advancements in communication and coverage.  The media started to use a reporting 
technique where a network of affiliates across the nation would be used to cover a large 
geographical area at one time.  The telegraph and dedicated pony express sped news 
across the nation allowing the public to get news of a battle while the battle ensued 
during the Civil War.  Competition between publishers pushed reporters to put accuracy 
and security below the need to get an article published first (Snyder, 2003) (McHugh, 
1997).  No controls were in place to prevent reporter bias or inaccuracy until the first and 
second world wars when heavy censorship was placed on the media.  The patriotic news 
media accepted the censorship as a necessity of war (Snyder, 2003).   
The speed of reporting was greatly increased with the invention of the radio, 
which became the primary source of news during WWII providing live war coverage 
from across the globe.  News coverage traveled ever greater distances through a robust 
radio communications system providing faster coverage of ongoing events.  However, the 
visualization of the news coverage was still primarily limited to the imagination of the 
public and the restrictions placed on the reporters.  
Television coverage of war began with Vietnam and eliminated the need for the 
public to imagine what war looked like.  In addition, most restrictions were lifted and 
reporters were free to cover events as they saw fit.  Live news coverage was still 
restricted to radio, but video taken from earlier in the day made that night’s evening news 
broadcast.  The American public was not ready for the realities of war and was shocked 
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by what they saw (Snyder, 2003).  Eventually the graphic depictions of war and 
inconsistencies between media reports and government statements resulted in a decline in 
public support for the Vietnam War (Snyder, 2003).  Events like Vietnam demonstrated 
the use of the media as a tool in asynchronous warfare.  Public opinion was affected by 
news media coverage which resulted in a U.S. withdraw, in effect allowing the adversary 
to win a battle. 
The amount of information readily accessible by the public continued to increase 
as television coverage became live with satellite technology and internet coverage during 
the early 1990's in the Gulf War.  Technology and reporting techniques successfully 
brought the war into the American home.   
As a result of decreased time for information to reach the public, the amount of 
time the DoD has to make decisions is reduced.  Public outcry is a major influence on 
DoD operations and media reports can affect the public’s opinion on DoD operations.  
When media reports do not include all the facts or distort the truth the DoD may not have 
the time to successfully educate the public on the nature of an operation, which may 
result in an operation being prematurely cancelled (O’Boyle, 2000).  Once the public has 
a set view of a situation it becomes increasingly difficult to change that view.  Many 
myths have resulted in the misuse of the media to include the effect the Vietnam War has 
had on Vietnam veterans.  In this example several reports state Vietnam veterans are 
more likely to commit suicide then the rest of the population, which is incorrect and 
based on false statistics (O’Boyle, 2000).  Even though the statistics are not substantiated 
the myth remains, so the DoD must remain cognizant of news media effects.   
 
34 
How the Military Adapted to News Media 
 During the time when colonial America was fighting for its independence, 
military leaders began to see the use of the media as a tool to influence public opinion, 
including the opinions of military personnel (Snyder, 2003).  The colonial military took 
control of any press who didn’t support their cause thus enforcing a positive influence on 
public and troop support.   
The luxury of news media control was diminished by a more substantial media 
during the Civil War.  As a result the military attempted to contain the flow of 
information by controlling telegraph lines, restricting the media’s access to military 
information, and physically shutting down any publisher who chose to distribute sensitive 
or classified information (Snyder, 2003).  During the Civil War military leaders realized 
their lack of guidance on how to deal the media.  After the Civil War military policy was 
written on how military members should deal with the media.  In addition, training was 
provided to standardize interactions military members had with the news media.  Further 
efforts in dealing with the media and community resulted in the creation of a public 
affairs office whose responsibility was relaying information between military leaders and 
the media, or public.  
WWI became a war that was covered under massive censorship.  The Espionage 
Act in 1917 and Enemy Sedition Act of 1918 made reporting disloyal information illegal.  
President Woodrow Wilson issued executive orders which gave the military control of 
the media.  The military used this control to add a requirement for war reporters to gain 
accreditation before being allowed access to the field.  The accreditation ensured the 
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reporter practiced nonbiased reporting and kept sensitive information from being 
published.  The government also used the media to increase public support for the war 
producing a massive propaganda campaign against Germany (Snyder, 2003).  Together, 
media censorship and anti German propaganda ensured public support throughout WWI.  
During WWII, self imposed censorship was employed.  The self-imposed 
censorship worked well due to the high level of patriotism (Aukofer and Lawrence, 
1995).  Due to some of the restrictions on reporters, during WWII the concepts for media 
pools and imbedded reporting were created.  Media pools came about because of the 
limited availability of radio transmission facilities and abundance of media reporters 
(Aukofer and Lawrence, 1995).  One reporter’s transmission would be broadcast by 
several networks.  Imbedded reporting came about with combat correspondents.  Combat 
correspondents were journalists who volunteered to enlist in the Marines and report as a 
member of a military unit.  Even with the new developments in war reporting, every 
report was run through a censorship board before publication throughout the Second 
World War. 
The military initially gave in to the demands of the public and decided to 
eliminate all forms of censorship during the Korean War, but eventually went back to 
heavy censorship.  Censorship for the Korean War included information that hindered the 
security of military operations and military members, deteriorated moral, or embarrassed 
the military or its allies (Aukofer and Lawrence, 1995).  The latter two restrictions were 
eventually eliminated in later wars because they were found to prevent free speech. 
The Vietnam War, on the other hand, did not impose censorship throughout the 
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war.  The media’s coverage of the Vietnam War resulted in a severe reduction in public 
support and consequentially resulted in the United States backing out of the war.  Not so 
much because of how the news media reported the war, but how the public realized the 
cost of the war (Aukofer and Lawrence 1995).  Public support was continually degraded 
as government reports of progress in the war failed to coincide with news reports of 
enemy actions.  After the Vietnam War several DoD directives were developed 
concerning the need to enhance public affairs.  The media was to be given maximum 
support in their efforts by the military, and the major combatant commands were 
responsible for maintenance of this support.   
However, the aid to the media was primarily considered a function of Public 
Affairs personnel.  Because of their reliance on the Public Affairs office commanders 
hardly ever considered the needs of the media when devising military operations and 
assumed any media needs could be handled independently by Public Affairs personnel 
(Aukofer and Lawrence, 1995).  This resulted in the complete exclusion of all media for 
the first two days of the Grenada conflict.  Afterwards, a DoD National Media Pool 
(DNMP) first conceived during the WWII was initiated to help ease logistical concerns 
for including media in war planning.  Military commanders misunderstood the intent of 
the DNMP and thought it would eliminate any need to include the media in military 
operations.  The result was another initial exclusion of the news media from the conflict 
in Panama. 
Currently, DoD policy is better understood so military planners can do a better job 
including the needs of the news media in military operations.  However, new problems 
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have surfaced.  Conflicts are harder to cover with round the clock operations and 
precision warfare.  Media reporters can only be assured coverage if they deploy with the 
military units conducting the attacks.  Reporters independently covering a conflict may 
become a liability to the military or are unlikely to witness any ongoing operations 
(Aukofer and Lawrence, 1995). 
DoD Information Disclosure Policy 
 One aspect of this research is whether or not too much information is being 
released to the public causing an increase in network incidents.  It is not the focus of this 
research to determine causation, but it is helpful to review the DoD directives and 
instructions pertaining to the release information within and outside the DoD.  There are 
three aspects of these documents of concern: U.S. information disclosure, foreign 
information disclosure, and the process of information classification. 
U.S. Information Disclosure 
 The discloser of DoD information to the U.S. public involves three key factors: 
responsibility for the information, methods of disclosing the information, and DoD news 
media support to ensure effective coverage of the information.  Responsibility for 
information disclosure lies with the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Public 
Affairs (ATSD(PA)), commanders, and Public Affairs personnel.   
The ATSD(PA) advises the Secretary and the Deputy Secretary of Defense on 
matters concerning news media relations, public information, community relations, and 
public affairs.  ATSD(PA) is the final approval for all policies, plans, programs, and 
actions that have operational implications.  ATSD(PA) acts as the sole spokesperson and 
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release authority for DoD information and audiovisual materials to news media 
representatives.  This includes establishing procedures for the administrative 
management, activation, and direction of the DoD National Media Pool.  Furthermore, 
the ATSD(PA) supports DoD objectives and operations by developing policies, plans, 
and programs to ensure free flow of news and information to the news media and general 
public while maintaining national security constraints laid out in Executive Order 12958, 
"Classified National Security Information," 1995.   
DoDI 5400.14 requires the commander of the combatant command to include 
public affairs needs in all DoD operations.  The needs of the media must be considered 
from the earliest stages of an operation.  DoDI 5400.14 clarifies the needs of the news 
media which include personnel, transportation, facilities, equipment, and communication 
assets.  With the help of Public Affairs a Joint Information Bureau (JIB) fulfills some of 
these needs by acting as the interface between the media and U.S. military forces during 
joint operations.  JIBs aid the commander in establishing a healthy relationship with the 
media and ensuring the media's needs are being met.  Public Affairs tasks include 
preparing reports for anticipated media questioning, setting policy, and preparing news 
statements.  Highest priority in media relations is placed on the training and 
transportation of public affairs support.  This is to ensure effective communication 
between public affairs personnel and the news media.  Support to the media should be a 
continuous 24 hours a day task.  The ultimate goal of Public Affairs actions are to 
provide the media with as complete a picture of the operation as is possible without 
hindering operations.   
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The DoD is required to support and cooperate in programs involving relations 
with the public, national associations, and non-governmental organizations consistent 
with DoD Directive 5410.18 and DoD Instruction 5410.19.  Methods to disclose 
information include media pools, standard media reporting, written statements, public 
announcements, and the like.  The most direct method of gaining information is directly 
from the source where the media is also allowed full access to DoD units and personnel 
involved in an operation.  The personal safety of correspondents must be considered 
when being allowed on the battleground, but it is not a reason for excluding the news 
media from military operations.  Access to personnel does take exception to those DoD 
personnel who need to remain anonymous for operational safety.  In addition to news 
reports and interviews the DoD also provides documentary products for release to the 
news media produced by Joint Combat Camera.   
Ground rules must be fully developed by the combatant commander and 
understood for the civilian news media to abide by.  The DoD established a set of 
guidelines to help DoD personnel better understand what the needs of the media are and 
how to establish a successful relationship.  Figure 5 depicts the DoD media guidelines for 
open and independent DoD operation reporting. 
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Figure 5: Department of Defense Media Guidelines (JP 3-61, 1997) 
 
Foreign Information Disclosure 
 Joint Publication (JP) 3-13 (1998) reinforces guidelines for U.S. media relations 
as with standard DoD media policy.  However, for certain operations foreign media can 
be an effective way to affect opposition members to include its leadership.  This is true 
because DoD policy regarding the disclosure of information to foreign nations is separate 
from local policy, such as the ability to conduct information operations.   The three forms 
of DoD information operations which affect foreign media are physiological operations 
(PSYOP), civil military operations (CMO), and military deception operations.  All three 
forms of operations must work with each other to eliminate or minimize contradictions 
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and maintain credibility with the agencies and populations of foreign nations and the U.S. 
(JP 3.61, 1997).   
 CMO and PSYOP manipulate information to influence foreign agencies and 
populations (JP 3-57, 2001; JP 3-53, 2003).  CMO is meant only to positively influence 
foreign populations, whereas PSYOP can have both positive and negative affects and is 
meant to directly influence foreign governments, leadership, military members. etc.  
Military deception as a tool used to create an advantage over a military adversary by 
deliberately misleading their leadership with false information about U.S. forces (JP 3-58, 
1996).  Deception operations, PA, CMO, and PSYOPS should be coordinated through 
one another prior to there use to ensure contradictory information isn’t released which 
could discredit the operation.  It is against DoD policy to misinform the U.S. public by 
any means therefore military deception, PSYOPS, and CMO is strictly to be used against 
non U.S. entities (JP 3-13, 1998).   
DoD Information Classification Policy 
The release of official DoD information to the public is limited only as necessary 
to safeguard information in the interest of national security or other legitimate 
governmental interest, as authorized by official government directives.  It is DoD policy 
that accurate and timely information is made available to the public, the Congress, and 
the news media to help the analysis and understanding of defense strategy and national 
security issues.  Any official DoD information intended for public release that pertains to 
military matters, national security issues, or subjects of significant concern to the 
Department of Defense shall be reviewed for clearance by appropriate security review 
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and Public Affairs offices prior to release (DODD 5230.9, 1996). 
The primary method to prevent classified and sensitive information from being 
reported is through the practice of "security at the source" where each individual is 
responsible to ensure no classified information is disclosed.  Other safeguards such as 
media ground rules and formal security reviews are not to be relied upon for safeguarding 
information (DoDI 5400.14, 1996).   
Prior its release any information must be classified either top secret, secret, 
confidential, or unclassified.  To be considered for classification above unclassified the 
information is required to include one or more of the following (Executive Order 12958, 
1995): 
1. Military plans, weapons systems, or operations. 
2. Foreign government information. 
3. Intelligence activities (including special activities), intelligence sources or 
methods, or cryptology. 
4. Foreign relations or foreign activities of the United States, including confidential 
sources. 
5. Scientific, technological, or economic matters relating to the national security. 
6. United States Government programs for safeguarding nuclear materials or 
facilities. 
7. Vulnerabilities or capabilities of systems, installations, projects or plans relating 
to the national security. 
 
On the other hand, in no case shall information be classified for the following reasons 
(Executive Order 12958, 1995): 
1. To conceal violations of law, inefficiency, or administrative error. 
2. To prevent embarrassment to a person, organization, or agency. 
3. To restrain competition. 
4. To prevent or delay the release of information that does not require protection in 
the interest of national security. 
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Other rules prevent certain information from being classified as well, such as basic 
scientific research not clearly related to national security may not be classified.   
Information may not be reclassified after it has been declassified and released to 
the public under proper authority.  However, if the information has not previously been 
disclosed to the public, under proper authority information may be classified or 
reclassified after an agency has received a request for it under the Freedom of 
Information Act. 
 Another aspect of information security is the disclosure of classified information 
through a collection of unclassified information.  Several separate reports of information 
which are individually unclassified may be classified if the compiled information reveals 
an additional association or relationship that meets the two following criteria: 
1. The compilation of information meets the standards for classification under 
Executive Order 12958, 1995. 
2. The classified aspects of the compilation of information are not otherwise 
revealed in the individual items of information.  
 
DoD personnel, while acting in a private capacity and not in connection with their 
official duties, have the right to prepare information for public release through non-DoD 
forums or media.  Clearance shall be granted if classified information is not disclosed, the 
DoD interests in non-classified areas are not jeopardized, and the author accurately 
portrays official policy, even if the author takes issue with that policy.  Such activity is 
authorized if: 
1. No laws or regulations are violated. 
2. Ethical standards and compliance with proper conduct are maintained (covered in 
DoDD 5500.7 and DoD 5500.7-R). 
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3. The preparation activities are not done during normal duty hours or with the use 
of DoD facilities, property, or personnel except as authorized by DoDD 5500.7 
and DoD 5500.7-R. 
4. The author does not use official DoD information generally not available to the 
public and which would not be released under DoD 5400.7-R. 
 
It is the responsibility of the Director, Washington Headquarters Services in conjunction 
with the heads of the DoD components to ensure compliance with the above directives.  
All are needed to provide assistance and recommendations on what policy and security 
implications may exist for information proposed for public disclosure. Whether or not 
these constraints are enough to prevent sensitive information from causing network 
attacks is a part of what this thesis is intended to discover. 
Summary 
The purpose of chapter II was to review current literature pertaining to network 
attacks against DoD networks and review aspects of how network incidents could be 
correlated to foreign news media coverage of DoD events.  Computer technology 
combined with networking technology has spread the ability to attack computer systems 
from a few knowledgeable individuals with direct access to the system to just about 
anyone with an internet connection.  Currently the advantages of using the internet 
outweigh the risks of network attacks.  The risk of network attack can be reduced through 
the use of information assurance tools such as IDS.  However, attack detection is difficult 
because networking technology wasn’t designed well for security and IDSs are limited in 
resources and capabilities.   
The problem of handling attacks is made worse by the difficulty in classifying 
network attacks.  Not being able to distinguish separate attacks consistently leads to 
 
45 
misrepresentation of data obscuring possible valuable information.  A better 
understanding of what causes individual to perform network attacks could help create 
more effective tools or revise DoD policy to reduce the number of attacks.  Several 
motivations exist for attacks conducted against DoD networks.  DoD policy should both 
limit the agitation of any negative motivations and increase the ability of the DoD to react 
effectively against an attack.  
DoD operations already consider the needs and the effect news media reports 
have on those DoD operations.  The extent of the affect media reports have on DoD 
operations is unclear and under constant ridicule.  The public has a right to know the 
actions being conducted by their military, but the security of DoD assets needs to be 
weighed carefully against the rights of the public.  Similar circumstances revolve around 
foreign media, however the U.S. military is not restricted in the use of information 
operations against foreign nations.  Therefore it would be possible to manipulate 
information disclosed to foreign sources in an effort to improve DoD network defenses.  
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III. Methodology Outline 
Chapter Overview 
This chapter details how the relationship between foreign news media reports 
covering U.S. military events and network incidents against DoD systems is examined.  
The first section describes the population of interest, the portion of the population 
collected for this research, where the data are acquired, and how the data are manipulated 
for the correlation test to be conducted.  Next, definitions and validation of the dependent 
variable (DoD network incidents) and independent variables (foreign news media reports) 
are given.  This chapter concludes with a description of the procedures used to answer the 
investigative questions presented in Chapter I. 
Data Collection 
 All data in this research are obtained from the Foreign Broadcast Information 
Service (FBIS) and the DoD NetDefense.  Each organization maintains an archive of data 
for the past several years including the dates of this study, 1 January 2002 through 30 
June 2004.  Data from NetDefense was collected and transcribed into a Microsoft Excel 
spreadsheet suitable for statistical analysis.  As is described below, data from FBIS had to 
be analyzed and quantified using the IN-SPIRE software data mining tool before being 
included in the MS Excel spreadsheet as well.  The raw data from both sources are 
considered For Official Use Only (FOUO) and are therefore not readily available to the 
public. 
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Table 2: Statistics on the Daily Number of FBIS Foreign News Media Reports for Each 
Region 
Central 
Eurasia China East Asia East Europe
Near East 
and South 
Asia
Sub-
Saharan 
Africa
The 
Americas
West 
Europe
Total 175618 140931 189773 166732 339623 110172 56941 141583
Average 193 155 208 183 372 121 62 155
Std Dev 105 57 73 77 78 40 23 49  
 
Table 3: Statistics on the Daily Number of DoD Network Incidents for Each Category 
CAT1 CAT2 CAT3 CAT4 CAT6 CAT7
Total 641 584 12552 115 116592 3013
Average 1 1 14 0 128 3
Std Dev 2 2 21 1 47 13  
 
Sample Population  
 Two groups of data will be analyzed in this research.  The first group consists of 
eight different regions of foreign news media reports (Central Eurasia, China, East Asia, 
East Europe, Near East and South Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, The Americas, and West 
Europe).  Media reports for each region are analyzed separately in an attempt to 
maximize the scope of this research.  Domestic news media reports were excluded due to 
the lack of a comparable data source for domestic reports.  The second group will consist 
of six different categories of network incidents tracked and recorded by NetDefense 
(unauthorized root access, unauthorized user access, unsuccessful attempted access, 
denial of service, unauthorized probe, and malicious logic).   
FBIS 
 FBIS offers an in-depth collection of translations and transcriptions of open 
source information monitored worldwide on such diverse topics as military affairs, 
politics, the environment, societal issues, economics, and science and technology.  The 
information is obtained by monitoring radio, television, press, periodicals, books and 
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other sources of unrestricted information such as databases and gray literature.  These 
translations and transcriptions are known collectively as “FBIS Reporting.”  Information 
is collected from over 3000 foreign media sources from all over the world.  All collected 
data is translated and converted into basic electronic text format.  The data collected is 
available daily through the FBIS website, or in a bi-monthly update on CD ROM.  The 
latest FBIS bi-monthly updates for the past 30 months, January 2002 through June 2004, 
will be used as the data source for the foreign news media reports. 
NetDefense  
 The DoD-CERT is presently known as NetDefense, a branch of the Global 
Network Operations Center, a component of Joint Task Force Global Network 
Operations (JTF-GNO).  The JTF-GNO mission is to protect, defend, and restore the 
integrity and availability of the essential elements and applications of the Global 
Information Grid.  NetDefense works closely with the following government agencies 
and non-profit organizations on a daily basis to improve incident tracking, technical 
assistance, and corrective actions: 
1. Army CERT (ACERT 
2. Navy CERT (NAVCERT) 
3. Navy Information Assurance 
4. Air Force CERT (AFCERT) 
5. Marine Corps NOSC (MCNOSC) 
6. DISA CONUS GNSC 
7. DISA PAC-RCERT 
8. US CERT 
9. DISA EUR-RCERT 
10. DISA CENTRAL-RCERT 
11. CERT Coordination Center 
12. NIPC 
13. CIAC 
14. FedCIRC 
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The information collected from the above listed government agencies are used to 
populate the Joint CERT Database (JCD) which supplies the incident data for this 
research.  Each of the 14 offices communicates with the other offices to improve incident 
response, however the JCD contains only DoD specific incident data.   
When responding to an incident the ideal response for an incident response team 
includes the following actions: 
1. Dispatch the team to the location of the incident. 
2. Perform diagnostic tests on the system. 
3. Preserve relevant data from the incident. 
4. Restore the system to a reliable state. 
5. Analyze system security. 
6. Return the system to operation and review findings. 
 
This process provides a standard method for each agency to both collect valuable incident 
data and restore the system.  In conjunction with the above process the Armed Services 
CERTs have established guidelines for categorizing network incidents.  The categories 
range from one to eight and are explained in Table 1 on page 20.  As was explained 
earlier, categories five and eight are excluded from this research because they do not 
pertain to the correlation being analyzed.  Incident response is still a relatively new 
process, however the efforts spent in the past decade has allowed processes and tools 
used by incident response teams to detect and categorize incidents to improve greatly.  
The timeframe of this thesis, January 2002 to June 2004, was chosen because the process 
of catching and categorizing incidents is best during most recent times and it was the 
largest sample that could be analyzed in the time allowed for this research. 
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Data Manipulation 
 The amount of data used, a total of 1,321,373 foreign news reports and 137,219 
DoD network incidents, in this research is too great to be handled in a reasonable amount 
of time manually.  Therefore two software analysis tools are required.  One tool, IN-
SPIRE, is used to quantify the total number of media reports and media reports 
containing military events for each day, and subsequently week, of the study from the 
FBIS archives.  Furthermore, IN-SPIRE is able to analyze multiple documents to find 
common words between those documents which can be used to determine the general 
content of a set of reports.  The other tool is Spearman's Rank Test performed on JMP 5.1 
software to determine the statistical significance of any correlations between the data. 
Data mining (IN-SPIRE) 
 SPIRE stands for Spatial Paradigm for Information Recognition and Exploration.  
The IN letters are used to distinguish the windows version of the software from the UNIX 
version.  IN-SPIRE software can query multiple documents, group documents by content, 
view the number of documents by a given timeframe, and retrieve a list of the most 
frequently used keywords in a collection of documents.  The two dimensional “Galaxy” 
visualization display of the IN-SPIRE software, which visually groups a collection of 
documents by content, is shown in figure 6.  By using these functions of IN-SPIRE the 
relationships of a collection of documents, that may not be immediately obvious through 
manual observation, can be thoroughly explored. 
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Figure 6: IN-SPIRE Galaxy Visualization Display 
 The Query tool (Figure 7) provides the ability to search for documents with 
certain content in a dataset using three different techniques; Vocabulary Work Queries: 
applying Boolean logic to vocabulary words, Exact Phrase Queries: searching with 
controlled scope and case sensitivity, and Queries by Example: measuring proximity of 
words in high-dimensional space.  Using this tool is a good way to begin to locate a 
group of documents that contain specific information in a dataset.  By entering a query, a 
concentration of documents of interest within a larger set of documents can be found 
quickly.  The Query tool also automatically selects and groups documents located by a 
query so they can be easily separated and studied apart from the rest of the documents.  
The Grouping tool is a convenient way to organize sets of documents for analysis.  By 
assigning documents to a group, query results can be rapidly retrieved and set operations 
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can be used to examine the union, difference, and intersection of documents sets.   
 
Figure 7: IN-SPIRE Query Tool Display 
With the Time Slicer function (Figure 8) a datasets evolution can be explored 
over time.  The Time Slicer works by examining the timestamp in each document and 
partitioning the dataset into discrete time slice views based on those timestamps.  
Document counts for each slice of time, from years to minutes, are depicted in a 
histogram.  By interacting with this histogram, an individual can rapidly “slice” through 
time and watch the information evolve over time, or simply determine the number of 
documents at a certain point in time.  The Time Slicer can partition a dataset only if 
timestamps are available when the dataset is initially processed, with the granularity of 
the time slices dependent on the granularity of the timestamp.  In this research the 
required slices of time will be in days.  
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Figure 8: IN-SPIRE Time Slice Tool Display 
The IN-SPIRE Gist tool (Figure 9) allows a user to see what words are used most 
often by a set of documents.  The Gist list is a sorting of words in order of the number of 
documents each word is used in, then alphabetically.  The Gist tool can also be used in 
conjunction with the Query or Stopword tools.  The Stopword function is used to remove 
insignificant words from the analysis of a set of documents.  Certain words are already 
maintained in the Stopword list, such as “the”, “and”, “it”, etc., but additional words 
determined to be insignificant to a particular analysis can be added with the use of the 
Stopword tool. With the use of other tools or by itself a Gist is capable of enhancing the 
exploration and understanding of a set of documents. 
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Figure 9: IN-SPIRE Gist Tool Display 
Spearman’s Rank Test 
 The nonparametric correlation test developed by Charles Spearman compares two 
independent random variables to determine if a correlation exists.  Unlike other 
correlation tools, Spearman’s rank test works with data that is ranked relative to the entire 
set of data for each variable.  Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient, represented as “rs,” 
provides a measure of correlation between each variable’s ranked datasets.  The formula 
for this measure of correlation is: 
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ui = Rank of the ith observation in sample 1 
vi = Rank of the ith observation in sample 2 
n = Number of pairs of observations (number of observation in each sample) 
A shortcut can be used to approximate rs when the number of ties in rankings for each 
sample is small compared to n.  The shortcut formula is given below: 
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 di = ui - vi (difference in the ranks of the ith observation for samples 1 and 2) 
Using the shortcut formula it is easy to see when the rankings are identical the differences 
between the ranks will be zero (note: the example below uses n=10 for demonstration 
purposes only): 
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Therefore a perfect positive correlation between sample sets of ranks is characterized by 
a correlation coefficient of rs = 1.  When the ranks indicate perfect disagreement the 
result is rs = -1, or perfect negative correlation. 
 The concept of correlation implies that two responses are obtained for each 
experimental unit.  Rank correlation methods can be used to measure the correlation 
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between any pair of variables regardless of the difference in measurements in the two 
datasets.  If two variables are measured on each of n experimental units, we rank the 
measurements associated with each variable separately.  When ties in rankings for each 
sample set are found, each data point is given a value based on the average of the ranks 
they would receive if they were unequal but occurred in successive order.  For example, 
if the 12th through 15th ranked measurements are tied each measurement will receive a 
rank of (12+13+14+15)/4 = 13.75.  After this is done we calculate the value of rs for the 
two rankings.  This value measures the rank correlation between the two variables. 
 A two tailed test for Spearman’s Nonparametric Test for Rank Correlation 
includes a null hypothesis that there is no correlation between the two sample populations 
being compared and an alternate hypothesis that a correlation does exist:  
H0: ρ = 0 (Null Hypothesis) 
Ha: ρ ∫ 0 (Alternate Hypothesis) 
The value rs, the sample rank correlation, is the test statistics.  The rejection region is 
defined as |rs| > rs,a/2 where the value of rs,a/2 is determined through the use of the t-
statistic when the number of  paired observations is greater then 30.  The equation used to 
determine the test statistic, rs, for a/2 and n pairs of observations using the t-statistic is 
given below. 
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 The assumptions required for using Spearman’s rank correlation are: 
1. Randomly selected sample of experimental units for each of the two variables 
being measured 
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2. Continuous probability distribution of the two variables being measured. 
Variable Definitions 
This section discusses the dependent and independent variables involved in the 
research.  Given the nature of this research, some leeway is required when assessing 
reliability and validity.  Mainly, both variables were taken from existing databases 
instead of a designed experiment.  Therefore, the data includes information that is 
irrelevant which may conceal potentially significant results.   
Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable for this study is the number of incidents per week for the 
six categories of incidents maintained in the JBS database.  The definitions for each of 
the categories are described earlier in Chapter II.  The number of incidents is easily 
determined from viewing the data separated by date and category in a Microsoft Excel 
spreadsheet.  Category VIII (other) incidents could have been added to category VI 
(probe or scan) data for this research because category VIII incidents are usually later 
reclassified as category 6 (Svetlev, 2004).  However, to ensure as high a level of validity 
as possible the combination of category VIII incidents is not done for this research.   
The incident data is grouped by the number of incidents per week where each 
week starts on a Sunday and ends on a Saturday.  The first week started on the first 
Sunday of January 2002 and ended on the last Saturday of June 2004.  Weeks are used 
instead of days to account for any lag in dates assigned to each incident as well as other 
potential variability in the sets of data.  Also, using the more numerous weekly data helps 
to comply with the Spearman’s Rank correlation assumption of continuous data. 
 
58 
Independent Variable 
The independent test group variable is the number of foreign news media reports 
per week with U.S. military content for each of the eight regions of the world monitored 
by FBIS.  The independent control group variable is the total number of foreign news 
media reports per week for each of the eight regions of the world monitored by FBIS. 
The terms used in the query to identify and separate media reports with U.S. military 
content are extensive but not all inclusive.  The news media report data are grouped by 
week in the same manner as the incident data to minimize possible lapses in the time to 
produce reports when compared to incident data and other potential variability within the 
sets of data.   
Test Development 
The null hypothesis (Ho) this research proposes is: no relationship exists between 
the number of foreign news media reports covering military events and network incidents 
against DoD systems.  The alternative hypothesis (Ha) this research will either reject or 
fail to reject is: a relationship does exist between foreign news media reports covering 
military events and network incidents against DoD systems.  The acceptable probability 
the null will be rejected when it should not, a type I error or a, is usually at or below 
0.01.  This means that if an a=0.01 is used then 1 out of 100 tests should be expected to 
result in a rejection of the null when the null hypothesis is true.  Because there are almost 
2500 individual tests performed for this research an a of 0.01 or higher would make the 
possibility of a type I error too great.  Therefore an a of 0.001 is a more reasonable figure 
for this research making it unlikely for a significant amount of type I errors to occur. 
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Research Questions 
 What is the nature of the relationship between foreign news media reports 
covering military events and network incidents against DoD networks? 
Investigative Questions 
 To better answer the research question, this research proposes to answer the 
following investigative questions: 
1. Do statistically significant correlations exist between different foreign regions 
of news media reports involving U.S. military events and different categories 
of DoD network incidents? 
2. During what timeframes do the most statistically significant correlations 
occur? 
3. What is the content of the news media reports for the timeframes that are most 
significantly correlated? 
Correlation Analysis 
 A correlation test requires each dataset to be quantitative, therefore the FBIS data 
needs to be converted into a quantitative form.  The IN-SPIRE tool is able to enumerate 
the number of media reports by date using the Time Slicer function.  This feature 
quantifies the news media data by enumerating the number of media reports occurring for 
each day of the two and a half year span.  The Time Slicer tool will also be used in 
conjunction with the Query tool to enumerate the number of foreign news reports that 
contain military events for each day of the study.  A conceptual analysis is done with the 
Query tool with the following list of terms to identify documents related in some way to 
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the U.S. military: 
"us military" or "u.s. military" or "usa military" or "u.s.a. military" or 
"united states military" or "us air force" or "u.s. air force" or "usa air 
force" or "u.s.a. air force" or "united states air force" or "us navy" or "u.s. 
navy" or "usa navy" or "u.s.a. navy" or "united states navy" or "us 
marines" or "u.s. marines" or "usa marines" or "u.s.a. marines" or "united 
states marines" or "us army" or "u.s. army" or "usa army" or "u.s.a. army" 
or "united states army" or "us dod" or "u.s. dod" or "usa dod" or "u.s.a. 
dod" or "united states dod"  
 
The documents found to have military content can then be exported to create a sub-set of 
media reports.  Again the Time Slicer tool is used to enumerate the number of media 
reports with U.S. military content for each day of the 30 month span.  Both the daily 
news media and incident data sets are transformed into weekly data.  The weekly 
timeframe is used to take into account the variability created by delays in publishing and 
correctly incident recording.  All data, the number of incidents and media reports per 
week, are consolidated into a single Excel worksheet for visual analysis. 
 Several statistical software programs are capable of handling the requirements of 
this research; JMP 5.1 was the most readily available.  The weekly incident data along 
with the weekly news media data are transferred into JMP 5.1 from the Microsoft Excel 
spreadsheet.  The first tests are accomplished using the entire 30 months worth of weekly 
data.  JMP 5.1 is used to perform a Spearman's Rho nonparametric rank test using 
multivariate analysis for each of the six categories of incidents against each of the eight 
regions of media reports and the eight regions of media reports with military content for a 
total of 96 tests. 
 The correlation tests between all foreign news media reports, regardless of 
military content, will be used as a test group.  A comparison of the correlation results 
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between the news reports that did and did not reference the U.S. military will provide 
insight into whether or not the news media’s coverage of military events has a more 
significant correlation then media reports in general.   
 Next, a time series test of the weekly data will be analyzed for each set of 
consecutive six month timeframes for the 30 months of data.  There are 25 six month 
timeframes for a total of another 2400 tests altogether.  JMP 5.1 will be used to perform a 
Spearman's Rho nonparametric rank test using multivariate analysis for each of the 25 six 
month datasets comparing the six categories of incidents against each of the eight regions 
of media reports and the eight regions of media reports with military content.  The results 
of the time series test will be compared with the overall correlation tests to determine 
which correlations vary over time and by how much those correlations vary compared to 
previous test results. 
 Finally, the IN-SPIRE Gist tool will be used to perform exploratory analyses and 
find commonly used terms in the media reports for each month of the study by region.  
The Gist tool will “get the gist” of a collection of documents used in a dataset by listing 
the words commonly used between documents, ordered by the number of documents 
each word is referenced in.  IN-SPIRE also displays the number of documents each word 
is found in.  The terms found in the Gists of the entire 30 month period will be done for 
each region for analysis and to use as a baseline to compare against common terms found 
in each six month timeframe.   
 Due to computer speed and IN-SPIRE software limitations the media data could 
only be analyzed one months and region at a time, so it was necessary to perform two 
 
62 
successive Gists, as will be described below, to produce a list of common terms rather 
then a preferable single Gist.  Furthermore, several insignificant terms will have to be 
added to the Stopword list to eliminate erroneous terms from the analysis.  The additional 
Stopwords will be determined by finding common terms from a few random 
month/region document sets.   Non key terms, such as adjectives or verbs, will be 
manually selected for inclusion into the Stopword list.  Once a list is created it will be 
used for each analysis of news media reports.   
 A Gist of each month and region combination will be used to collect words 
common to at least 90% of the documents for that month and region.  The terms will then 
be used to create a document of common terms for each month of each region.  The result 
will be 30 documents of common terms for each region, for both all inclusive media 
reports and media reports covering the U.S. military, 480 documents altogether.  The 
documents of common terms can then be viewed with IN-SPIRE for the entire 30 months 
of this study by region.  At this point a regional Gist will be used to find the 20 most 
common words are in all 30 months of data for each region.  The 20 common terms do 
not have to be common between every month, but the greatest number of months.  The 
result is a regional list of 20 terms common to at least 90% of the documents for each 
month and region and common to the majority of months of that region.   
A similar process is accomplished on only the months and regions found to have a 
significant correlation using the six month timeframe Spearman’s Rank tests.  The same 
documents created above of 90% common terms are viewed with IN-SPIRE for each set 
of months, by region, where a correlation was found to be significant in the 6 month 
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timeframe analysis.  The significantly correlated timeframes for a region will be 
combined when they run in succession, are correlated to the same incident category, and 
have the same type of correlation (positive or negative).  Again, the second set of 
common terms will be limited to the 20 most common key words for each set of months 
and regions found to be significantly correlated to DoD network incidents.  A manual 
comparison between the 20 word lists and 30 month lists of key terms will be used to 
better understand potential reasons for any significant correlations. 
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IV. Analysis and Results 
Chapter Overview 
 The purpose of this research is to determine what relationships exist between 
foreign media coverage of military events and DoD network incidents through qualitative 
codification and quantitative statistical analysis of data collected by NetDefense and the 
Foreign Broadcast Information System (FBIS).  This chapter presents the results of the 
statistical and qualitative analysis to answer the three investigative questions described in 
Chapter III.  The results of the three research questions are presented in their own 
sections below. 
30 Month Timeframe Spearman Rho Tests 
Based on a significance level of 0.001 and the 129 weeks of data, the rejection 
criterion was to reject the null hypothesis if |rs|>0.2867.  The results of the individual 
Spearman tests have been tabulated and are displayed in Table 2 and 3 below.  These 
results indicate the null hypothesis should be rejected for a α of 0.001 in a two tailed test.   
In all, 10 of the 96 rank correlations were determined to be statistically significant 
with a significance level of 0.001.  Six of the ten significant correlations involved media 
related to military events.  The average value of the six significant correlations between 
network incidents and military related media, 0.4318, was larger then the average r value 
of the other four correlations of all inclusive media, 0.3631.   
Of the six types of the incident categories studied for the full 30 months, III, VI, 
and VII (attempted access, probe or scan, and malicious code respectively), were found to 
have at least one significant correlation.  In addition, three of the eight regions for all 
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inclusive media reports had at least one significant correlation: China, East Europe, and 
Sub-Saharan Africa.  Five regions for U.S. military related media reports had at least one 
significant correlation: Central Eurasia, East Asia, East Europe, Near East and South 
Asia, and West Europe.  Both positive and negative correlations were found to be 
significant in the results of the rank tests.  With the exception of category VII incidents 
for all inclusive media, each region or category maintained either positive or negative 
correlations.  Negative correlations were more common with six being negative and four 
being positive. 
Table 4: Results of Spearman Rho Test for Each Region and DoD Network Incident 
Combination for All Media Reports from Jan 2002 Through Jun 2004 
 I II III IV VI VII 
Central Eurasia -0.1216 0.1309 -0.0667 -0.0012 -0.0023 -0.1849 
China 0.1702 0.0116 0.1201 -0.1559 -0.1760 0.3325* 
East Asia -0.0537 0.0291 0.0456 0.0973 -0.1530 -0.1083 
East Europe -0.0420 -0.0191 -0.4355* 0.1596 0.0382 -0.2783 
Near East/South Asia 0.0319 -0.0159 0.0497 -0.0984 -0.2759 0.0606 
Sub-Saharan Africa -0.2524 0.1689 -0.3498* 0.2095 -0.1980 -0.3345* 
The Americas -0.0611 -0.0802 0.1919 -0.0544 -0.0653 0.0823 
West Europe 0.0975 -0.0383 0.0478 -0.0090 0.1292 0.0082 
* rs values greater than the critical value 0.2865 at the 0.001 level for a two tailed test 
 
Table 5: Results of Spearman Rho Test for Each Region and DoD Network Incident 
Combination for Military Media Reports from Jan 2002 Through Jun 2004 
 I II III IV VI VII 
Central Eurasia -0.2848 0.1467 -0.2502 0.1561 -0.0618 -0.5124* 
China -0.0583 0.0560 0.1281 0.0634 -0.2089 -0.1990 
East Asia -0.0561 0.1012 0.0215 0.1211 -0.3143* -0.3153* 
East Europe -0.1678 -0.0381 0.4535* -0.0137 -0.0164 0.1381 
Near East/South Asia -0.0436 0.0983 0.4753* -0.0870 -0.0433 0.1415 
Sub-Saharan Africa -0.1135 -0.0780 0.0652 -0.0144 -0.0848 0.0352 
The Americas -0.0427 0.0511 0.1150 -0.0152 -0.1057 -0.2137 
West Europe 0.0059 0.0895 0.5198* 0.0025 0.0456 0.2058 
* rs values greater than the critical value 0.2865 at the 0.001 level for a two tailed test     
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6 Month Timeframe Spearman Rho Tests 
Based on a significance level of 0.001 and the 26 weeks of data for each six 
month correlation test, the rejection criterion was to reject the null hypothesis if 
|rs|>0.6034.  The 2400 tests conducted for this part of the research made it inconvenient to 
list the results of each test.  Therefore, the results of the individual Spearman’s Rho tests 
have been consolidated in Table 4 and 5 below to list each significant correlation 
coefficient found and the months, region, and incident category in which it was 
significant.  None of the media-incident correlations other then those listed in table 4 and 
5 for the six month timeframes exceeded the minimum rs value of 0.6034 and are 
therefore not listed in Tables 4 and 5 below.  These results indicate the null hypothesis 
should be rejected for a α of 0.001 in a two tailed test.   
In all, 39 of the 2400 rank correlations were determined to be statistically 
significant with a significance level of 0.001.  28 of the 39 significant correlations existed 
within media related to military events.  Much like the 30 month correlations, the average 
value of the 28 significant correlations between network incidents and military related 
media, 0.6654, was slightly larger then the average r value of the other 11 all inclusive 
media incident correlations, 0.6513.   
Of the six types of incident categories studied for the six month timeframes, I, III, 
VI, and VII (unauthorized root access, attempted access, probe or scan, and malicious 
code respectively), were found to have at least one significant correlation.  In addition, 
every region but West Europe was found to have a significant correlation using all 
inclusive media reports.  However, every region but East Asia and The Americas were 
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found to have a significant correlation using news media reports covering the U.S. 
military.  Both positive and negative correlations were found to be significant in the 
results of the rank tests.  With the exception of category III incidents for military related 
media correlations in Central Eurasia, each region and incident category correlation 
maintained either positive or negative correlations.  Unlike the 30 month tests, positive 
correlations were slightly more common with 24 significant correlations being positive 
and 15 negative ones. 
Table 6: Results of Spearman Rho Test for Each Region and DoD Network Incident 
Combination for All Media Reports from Jan 2002 Through Jun 2004 in Six Month 
Increments 
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Table 7: Results of Spearman Rho Test for Each Region and DoD Network Incident 
Combination for Military Media Reports from Jan 2002 Through Jun 2004 in Six Month 
Increments 
 
 
Significant Media Content 
The results found in the content of the foreign media reports were divided into 
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two sections.  The first section is concerned with the words most significant to each 
region for all 30 months.  The second section displays the 20 most significant key terms 
for those months and regions found to have the highest correlation significance.  
Regional Exploratory Analysis 
A list of Stopwords (Appendix A) was extracted from three test Gists using the 
data from three randomly selected sets of news media reports:  January 2002 Central 
Eurasia, July 2002 China, and March 2004 The Americas.  These reports were combined 
and used to manually extract words insignificant to the intent of this research not already 
included in the IN-SPIRE Stopword list.  These words were then added to the existing 
IN-SPIRE Stopword list.   
Next a Gist was performed to determine what words were common to at least 
90% of the media reports for a given month and region.  This list was then used to 
determine what words, from the lists of terms common to at least 90% of media reports, 
were most common to all 30 months of media reports for each region.  The number of 
most common terms was limited to 20 to simplify a manual review.  Each of the 20 
words on a list was in at least 90% of the media reports for a given month and region, and 
also one of the top 20 most commonly used key terms between those months for the 
region.  The resultant lists are shown in Table 6 and 7 below.  Each list is ranked first by 
frequency then alphabetically, so the most frequently used terms are first on the list in 
alphabetical order and followed by the second most frequently used terms in a separate 
alphabetical order.     
Through manual review of Table 6 and 7 the common terms suggest the primary 
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content of each region’s media are concerned with places within the region, politics, and 
government.  A few words which relate to the research being performed, such as 
“internet”, “army”, “terrorism”, and “weapons” are present but do not appear to be any 
more relevant to correlated regions then non-correlated regions.   
Table 8: Results of the Media Content Analysis for All Media Reports from Jan 2002 
through Jun 2004 
Central 
Eurasia* China East Asia*
East 
Europe*
Near East & 
South Asia*
Sub-
Saharan 
Africa*
The 
Americas
West 
Europe*
cooperation audiences computer belgrade economic democratic economic english 
economic beijing domestic democratic english economic english foreign 
english chinese economic english foreign english foreign internet 
foreign economic editorial european internet foreign internet minister 
leader english english foreign leader french minister national 
minister filing foreign minister minister internet national policy 
ministry foreign internet ministry national leader officials political 
moscow hong intervention national political minister political president 
national internet japan  political president national president security 
political kong korea president security opposition security united 
president national minister republic war political spanish european 
russia prc national security arabic president united french 
security president officials social iran security trade paris 
authorities root president union islamic war million turkey 
relations taiwan rok law officials officials american union 
vladimir xinhua seoul opposition policy republic policy economic 
law minister tokyo economic united united ministry german 
republic officials ministry leader arab police social leader 
federal political united internet israel talks leaders democratic 
itar united yonhap police israeli nation police war  
* Regions found to have at least one significant correlation 
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 Table 9: Results of the Media Content Analysis for Media Reports with Military Content 
from Jan 2002 through Jun 2004 
Central 
Eurasia* China East Asia*
East 
Europe*
Near East & 
South Asia*
Sub-Saharan 
Africa*
The 
Americas
West 
Europe*
moscow beijing english english english president  english bush 
russian chinese internet minister foreign english foreign foreign 
defense defense japan political internet african internet minister 
political english tokyo war iraq internet president president 
president force united army minister minister united security 
security foreign defense defense political national minister united 
united internet foreign european president united national war 
force national intervention foreign security american security washington 
foreign political korea national united army war internet 
minister prc national nato war war washington iraq 
american president war president bush french political political 
ministry security korean security force security army french 
war united officials united islamic force bush national 
army war security force american iraq force force 
cooperation weapons computer ministry afghanistan foreign troops policy 
national bush president troops army kenya officials army 
armed economic troops iraq policy armed spanish english 
relations policy rok commentary washington terrorism defense american 
territory iraq force policy arab bush iraq iraqi 
english power minister internet iraqi political terrorism weapons  
* Regions found to have at least one significant correlation 
Significant Timeframe Exploratory Analysis 
 There were 2400 individual tests given the two sets of media reports for 8 regions, 
6 incident categories, and 25 six-month timeframes.  Below in tables 8 and 9 are the 
results of the media content analysis for the months out of these 2400 tests found to be 
significant.  Each list contains 20 of the most commonly used key terms for a given 
region and incident category during the months significant correlations were found.  The 
lists were compiled in a similar manner to the regional exploratory analysis above and are 
described in Chapter III.  Some of the timeframes were combined with one another 
because they ran concurrently and had the same positive or negative correlation.  When 
this was the case, the most common key terms were found for the combination of months 
found to be correlated.  Because of this method the 39 correlations found for the six-
month timeframes were consolidated into 21 correlations.  Each of the 20 words on a list 
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was in at least 90% of the media reports for a given month and region, and also one of the 
top 20 most commonly used key terms between those months and regions.  Each list is 
ranked first by frequency then alphabetically, so the most frequently used terms are first 
on the list in alphabetical order and followed by the second most frequently used terms in 
a separate alphabetical order. 
The lists were manually reviewed for their content and compared to the regional 
media content lists in Table 6 and 7 above.   No significant terms were distinguished 
from the lists in Table 8 and 9 below from the lists in Table 6 and 7 above.  In the lists of 
Table 8 and 9 below a few unique terms were identified, but were not consistent 
throughout the lists. 
Table 10: Results of the Six Month Timeframe Media Content Analysis for All Media 
Reports from Jan 2002 through Jun 2004 
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Table 11: Results of the Six Month Timeframe Media Content Analysis for Media 
Reports with Military Content from Jan 2002 through Jun 2004 
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V.  Conclusions and Recommendations  
Conclusions of Research 
 This study performs both quantitative and qualitative analysis on a collection of 
30 months worth of foreign news media reports from over 3,000 international sources 
divided into eight separate regions, excluding the United States.  The analysis was 
designed to determine if a correlation existed between foreign news media reports 
covering U.S. military events and network incidents against DoD networks.  It also was 
meant to help better understand the nature of such a relationship by determining what key 
terms were used in the contents of the media reports found to be significantly correlated 
with the news media reports.  Significant correlations were found between several 
combinations of regions and categories of network incidents for both news reports 
covering the U.S. military and the entire collection of news reports.  However, a greater 
amount of more significant correlations were found when the news reports pertained to 
military events.  To help understand the nature of the correlation the most common terms 
used within the thousands of foreign news reports were found.  Unfortunately, the 
correlations were only moderate and the key terms only led to a slightly better 
understanding of such relationships.  Therefore a correlation does exist, but a 
determination of causation is left unanswered. 
Review of Results 
 It is obvious a great deal more analysis is required to determine the true nature of 
the relationship between foreign news media reports and DoD network incidents.  The 
three investigative questions were answered, but resulted in more questions then answers.  
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The following sections review the results from the two types of tests conducted in this 
research. 
Correlation Tests 
 Clearly the data are not in complete agreement when we look at the results in the 
differences between the six month timeframes and the regional analysis.  I expected any 
significant regional correlations for a region and incident category to contain a large 
number of six month correlations for the same region and incident category.  However, 
only a few such cases existed.  For military coverage report data there were three cases 
were significant correlations existed between both the 30 and the 6 month analysis.  Only 
one case was found with all inclusive news data.  In all cases the number of months found 
to be significant through the six month tests did not correlate with the magnitude of the 
correlation coefficient, at least not relative to each other.  For example, Sub-Saharan 
Africa news reports were found to be correlated with category III incidents positively for 
the 30 month test and negatively for a six month correlation test.  In addition, the number 
and magnitude of six month correlations were much higher for the Near East & South 
Asia region then the Central Eurasia region, but the 30 month correlation for Central 
Eurasia was higher.   
The validity of the decision to reject the null is improved when the total numbers 
of correlations are examined in light of the significance level.  I expected to see two or 
three coefficients within the rejection region because the significance level was 0.001 and 
there were 2496 test.  This means about 2.5 tests should be the result of a Type I error.  In 
all, 49 tests resulted in a rejection of the null far exceeding the bounds of what may put 
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the decision to reject the null in question. 
Looking back at the data the number of news media reports covering U.S. military 
events per week for East Europe, Sub-Saharan Africa, and The Americas were quit low 
and probably not suitable for rank correlation testing.  Furthermore, the same case can be 
made for the number of category I, II, and IV network incidents per week.  This is 
especially the case for category IV incidents were a large amount of zero values created 
an especially high number of ties in ranking the data.  Fortunately few correlations were 
found to be significant involving the questionable data.  
Media Content 
 The content of the news media reports were mostly of a political nature.  There 
were also several specific places of high interest which coincided with the region of 
media reports.  A few key words did stick out from the lists such as “internet”, “army”, 
“weapons”, and “terrorism” but do not appear to be relevant to the nature of a correlation.  
No consistent set of key words were found which might lead to a better understanding of 
the cause of a correlation.  The most significant finding, when looking at the results of the 
news media content analysis, is the need for further refinement in how the exploratory 
analyses are conducted. 
Practical Implications 
 The significance of this research is not only how a correlation was shown to exist 
between foreign news media coverage of U.S. military actions, but how most of the 
correlations found were with Category III incidents (attempted access).  Category III 
incidents are one of the most prevalent types of incident, which is not surprising as it is 
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the most simplistic for an attacker to perform and get away with.  The key issue with this 
type of attack is how it is used as a way to scope out a network's defenses.   Attempts at 
access are the first step in attaining access to a network and is therefore more likely to be 
conducted in the same timeframe as a media report which is correlated with it.  I am most 
concerned with the lack of effective IDS in which case the true number of successful 
attacks isn’t being recorded and a significant correlation may go unnoticed.  However, 
this is only a slight concern given this test was based on ranking the data.  Even if there 
were a significant number of successful attacks going unnoticed the relative nature of the 
tests should have shown a significant correlation if one existed. 
 Because no direct causation could be determined, no actions can be made by the 
DoD to better their defenses against network incidents.  Once follow-on research is 
accomplished and quantifies what the aspects of the DoD and foreign news media 
relationships are, more direct actions can be specified to minimize network attacks. 
Recommendations  
 This study was an expansion of previous research into how news media can be 
used to better predict or defend against future network incidents.  The amount of previous 
research was small and its content was vague and based on somewhat erratic data.  There 
are multiple areas in this field of study for expansion and improvement. 
News Media and Network Incident Relationship 
 The most notable recommendation is to narrow the focus of the news media 
content from all inclusive and U.S. military coverage to several mutually exclusive yet 
collectively exhaustive types of news content.  The fact that significant correlations were 
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found shows a relationship does exist between foreign news media and DoD network 
incidents and should be explored further.   A higher significance level was found in the 
correlation coefficient with tests of foreign news media reports containing U.S. military 
events then tests involving all inclusive foreign news media reports.  This difference 
shows how the separation of media reports containing military events has proportionately 
more significantly correlated media reports then the entire collection of news media 
reports.   
Another consideration is the potential lag between published reports and incident 
reporting and categorization.  The same data could be reanalyzed taking into account lags 
by matching incident data from each week with the previous week of media data, or vise 
versa.  Such tests would show how time affects the relationship.  The lag tests could also 
be used as evidence to support or refute theories of causation. 
Looking at the moderate magnitude of the correlations, using the most common 
key terms within the news reports was perhaps misleading.  The true nature of a 
correlation was much less common.  A better way to go about the analysis would have 
been to use IN-SPIRE, or a better data mining tool, to quantify the less frequently used 
terms then use this list of terms to separate the media into meaningful yet separate 
sections for analysis.  A few suggested types of media content more specific to a 
relationship are: forms of conflict, political viewpoints, methods of network attacks, 
incident related news, and computer related news.  Using this improved analysis 
technique the relationship could then be further reduced to its true nature and justify 
reason for a causal-comparative study to be performed.  
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One last idea is to perform a more detailed correlation analysis by separating the 
different DoD agencies network incidents.  Such a study may show how an agency is 
being singled out for attacks, or how certain news media is correlated more to certain 
DoD agencies.  This may, however, prove difficult with limited incident data. 
Text Mining 
 The techniques used to extract the news media content in this research were less 
then ideal.  The obvious solution would be to gain access to more powerful data mining 
tools and computer systems.  If this is the case, then it may be possible to view more then 
a couple months’ worth of media reports for a single region at a time.  To be able to view 
the set of reports as a whole would drastically improve the ability to determine how to 
divide the media into separate meaningful sections.  In the absence of such tools, one can 
learn from the techniques used in this research.   
 The Stopwords tool was necessary while using IN-SPIRE software to remove an 
abundance of insignificant words cluttering the list of key terms found for a set of reports.   
Several stopword lists could be combined from the months of reports to eliminate the 
insignificant information and improve the results of the Gist tool.  A thorough use of 
these tools to find less significant key words may prove beneficial when separating a set 
of documents into separate yet all inclusive sections.   
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Appendix A 
Additional Stopwords used for Media Content Analysis: 
unclassified report prohibited material owners permission contain copyright fbis 
dissemination copying copyrighted jan feb mar apr may jun jul aug sep oct nov dec text 
gmt translated source description January February March April May June July august 
September October November December agency government news information main 
time told people according country transcribed deputy head situation www affairs service 
independent international newspaper including countries official meeting press 
correspondent excerpt provided company region forces means chief development council 
special interfax office former omitted set held visit world decision website passage 
department support day version local central tv following television media reports 
received prime level issue site system presenter devoted district daily operation article 
signed course party representatives control similar issues result regional agreement 
results reported called question cent data staff radio current major noted percent 
discussed director yesterday opinion taking five avn written position intended past days 
recently process conditions measures prior help interview ago believe air example times 
plans particular various total start discuss near basis experts organization left purposes 
speaking actions months session content increase services found serious expected 
organizations based stressed carried period operations city companies consent decided 
market secretary reason announced recent soon term six activities believes life paper anti 
controlled redistribution centre plan view close started programme change difficult 
reserved half  line week holding entitled real planned html sent isp expressly 
republication currently channel north ready units equipment expressed representative 
 
81 
sources events statement involved efforts video hold building addition attention station 
documents terms due meet aimed technical center industry created officers house stated 
met matter third considered role assembly words prepared added details deputies aid 
regions adopted mass seen simply hand internal parties changes document earlier amount 
questions form leave led reached action moreover Wednesday Monday Tuesday 
Thursday Friday Saturday Sunday especially saying increased beginning entire paid hope 
bilateral activity despite status personnel using approved true resources return effect 
brought draft interior remain sector single pro field possibility private month program 
create connection confirmed premier bodies list provide audience owned live southern 
established managed spokesman account moment agencies final project speaker arrived 
receive decisions heads specialists trying plant stock free accordance agreed seven reach 
reasons name previous person step top board deal natural experience potential specific 
active scale ensure views immediately organized issued participation sign carrying 
majority conducted talk settlement developing exchange regard headquarters task 
complex facilities assistance act implementation training whom carry consider 
community agree develop reform stage laws executive meetings march figures passed 
appointed influence resolution investment presence positive closed bring rate understand 
property agreements idea concerned east discussion demand planning prospects 
particularly cut registered hours happened growth mean completely remains common 
leading base headed date space structures run late peace participants coming movement 
look supreme supply changed viewpoint ties nor operating land developed health lost 
included industrial northern probably proposed meanwhile declared purpose call concern 
concerning charge commercial systems towards hard subject respect billion join elite 
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event allow speak opportunity makes projects begin rule supported personal finally 
positions submitted purchased team url vice town proposals significant effective lead 
pressure tasks completed detained regarding direct attempt try move talking language 
living additional figure cost progress stop creation launched include calls candidates acts 
highly structure intends eight ru west south importance worth note formed outside tried 
ones explained spent impossible described independence mutual incidentally complete 
located appeal key statements mission built continuing proposal responsible instance unit 
guard range comment decree existing accused begun extremely steps st via allowed 
forced informed customs directorate rise principle promised normal related intend 
responsibility 
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